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The treatment and control of inmates within a prison
system is not an exact science. It is an orten debated
subject and invokes a great amount of passion from those who
feel strongly abou~ this issue. Many believe that all
convicted felons should be locked up and provided with only
the necessities of life. Many feel equally strong that
inmates should be provided with all the ser:ices available
to the public, inc~uding medical services, ~ab training, and
educational opport~ities. Even if little agreement exists
regarding the idea: treatment and control 0: prisoners, this
decision is most o:ten directly related to ~he funding
provided for the operation of the prison system.
When society's most violent offenders are brought
together as a group within a prison setting, it is almost
..certain that viole:lce will continue. The c~nditions that
encourages violence and the methods used to control the
violence is the sujject of this writer's re5earch. A
comparison of Texa5 prison conditions and methods of control
used prior to and :ollowing intervention by the Federal
Court will be ex~ed. Some of the Federa: Court Orders
and their impact upon the control of violen=a will be
discussed.
1
Involvement of the Federal Court
In 1972 David Ruiz, a prisoner of the Texas Department
of Corrections, filed suit against the Texas Department of
Corrections and its Director, W. J. Estelle Jr., seeking
\
relief for alleged violations of his constitutional rights.
In the spring of 1974, Judge William Wayne Just~ce, Chief
Judge of the U.S. District Court Eastern Division,
consolidated the Ruiz lawsuit with those of seven other
Texas Department of Corrections prisoners into a single
action, Ruiz v. Estelle. Judge Justice appointed attorneys
for the plaintiff as a class action lawsuit. T~e class was
composed of past, present, and future Texas Defartment of
Corrections prisoners. Additionally, Judge Jus~ice approved
a motion to include the United States Justice Department as
a plaintiff intervener.1
During the pre-tr~al process the defendants were
successful in having tie trial moved to Houston in an
attempt to prevent Jud;e Justice from hearing t~e case.
-.Judge Justice, however, was assigned to hear the case in
Houston and the trial sta~ed on October 2, 197:. The trial
concluded on September 20, 1979, after 159 days of trial in
1 Overview to Ruiz, et aI, v. McCotter, et aI, A
Summary of Relevant Or~ers, Stipulations, Report3 and Issues,
(TDC Management Services, October 1986), p. 3.
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which 349 witnesses testified and 1,500 exhibits were
presented. 2
The Court issued its opinion regarding the case on
December 12, 1980. It found that the practices and
\
c"onditions within the Texas Department of Corrections
violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the J.S.
Constitution prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment and
the deprivation of due process of law. The Court ordered
the parties to meet to attempt to agree on a proposed order
to resolve the issues raised in the case. A Consent Jecree
was drafted by the parties i~ February 1981 and apprc7ed by
the Court on April 20, 1981. The Consent Decree resc:ved
some issues primarily related to health care and worK
safety.3
Those issues on which tie parties were unable to agree
were addressed by the Court ~n an order entitled Decr:e
Gra~tinq Equitable Relief ar-1Declaratorv Judqement w~ch
was entered on April 24, 198:, and amended on May 1, :989.
The Amended Decree cove=ed several distinct iss~=s,
inc:uding overcrowding, the "J.seof prisoner "building
tend.ers," disciplinary due p=ocess procedures, use of
2Ibid.
3David Ruiz. et al. v. W.J. Estelle. et aI, Civi~ Action
No. H-78-987, United States :ist=ict Court, Southern C~vision
of ~exas, Houston Division, :onsent Decree, April 20, 1981.
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physical force, access to courts, and fire safety
standards.4
The defendants appealed the court judgement to the
U. S. Court of Appeals in 1981. The Appeals Court affirmed
\
the major parts of Judge Justice's order.
The parties subsequently entered into a number of
stipulations settling outstanding issues of concern.
Additionally, the Court appointed a Special Master to assist
the Cour~ by monitoring the Texas Department of Corrections
compliances with the terms of the court orders and
subsequent agreements.
The implementation of the court ordered. procedures
required drastic changes in the manner that the Texas
Department of Corrections operated its prison system. The
order to implement the changes af=ected almost every aspec~
of an ex~remely large complex ins~itution. This ranged frsm
the basic philosophy of managing ~ates to the millions 0=
dollars ~eeded to be appropriated for everYthing from new
..buildings to thousands of additio::al employees at a time
when the Texas economy was suffer~g from the downturn in
the oil ~usi-~ess. At the heart 0= this controversy was the
deep sea~ed feeling of most Texans that Texas did not need
any outs~ders telling them how to run their business. It
4David Ruiz. et al, v. W.J. Estelle. et aI, Civil Acti~n
No. H-78-987, United States Distr~=t Court, Southern Divisi~n
of Texas, Houston Division, Decre~ Granting Equitable Reli~f
and Declaratory Judgement, April 24, 1981.
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would be several years before the Texas Department of
Corrections would cooperate in implementing the court orders
due to the resentment of prison administrators and personnel
to change what they perceived as an effective prison system.
\
They would point out that the Texas Department of
Corrections' rate of homicides, staff assaults and major
riots were among the lowest of any Ame~ican prison system.5
They would also point out that because of the Texas
Department of Corrections farming and ~anufacturing
industries, the cost of maintaining an inmate was among the
lowest in the nation. Usually accomp~~ying the discussion
would be an often repeated saying, "If it ain't broke, don't
fix it."
As the Texas Department of Correc~ions began to
implement the court ordered reforms, tie management of
violence became a crisis. The guards =ould no longer use
the old methods of control with which ~hey were familiar,
and they did ~ot have the knowledge or procedures in place,
.within the ccurt guidelines, that couli control the
violence. As a result, employee morale dropped and inmates
quickly became aware of the void of au~hority and reacted
quickly to ot~ain power. Various illegal disruptive groups,
Texas Syndica~e, ~exican Mafia, Aryan 3rotherhood (prison
gangs), compe~ed to obtain their share of the illegal drug
5BenCrouch and James Marquart,L~tigatedReform of
Texas Prisons:An Appeal to Justice,Aus~in:University of
Texas Press, :989), p. 46.
5
market and control over other inmates by physical violence.
In 1984, 25 inmates were murdered by other inmates and 404
inmates were victims of stabbings. In 1985, the homicide
rate jumped to 27 with an additional 237 inmates victims of
\
s.tabbings by other inmates. 6
During the implementation of the court ~rdered reforms,
much of the prison staff attempted to use t~e old method to
control the violence. Much of the prison s~aff did not
fully accept or understand the new guidelines imposed by the
court. The new guidelines did not appear tc allow the staff
to use the necessar] amount of force and otter methods many
believed necessary ~o control the outbreak c~ violence.
During this time it appeared to many that tte Texas
Department of Corrections no longer maintai~ed control of
its institutions.7
Cor-trol of Inmate Violence
Prior to the Ruiz v. Estelle Dec~ion
The cause of violence within a prison s7stem is a
..complex issue and p=obably will never be cOII:.;:letely
eliminated. When society's most violent cr~nals are
grouped together wi~hin a prison setting, it ~ould seem
logical to expect a certain amount of viole~=e. Likewise,
TDC's response to managing the violence pric= to Ruiz v.
6Texas
Office.
Depart::ent of Corrections Pui::"ic Information
7Daniel Peder::on, Daniel Shapiro, anc. Ann McDaniel,
"Inside America's F=ison," Newsweek, October 6, 1986, p. 56.
6
Estelle is a complex issue and involves a wide variety of
both formal and informal controls. Some of these controls
involve TDC's philosophy encompassing the work ethic, a
complex system of punishments and rewards, a social system
\
involving both TDC employees and inmates, physica~
punishment, and an inmate building tender system.
When Texas first es~ablished a prison system in 1848,
in Huntsville, it was designed and based on the "Auburn
Model" which was a walled building where inmates Norked to
produce goods under strict control.B The revenue from the
products were to be a scurce of state income. Al~hough the
prison system did not aciieve the goal of self supporting,
the idea that inmates should be forced to work to "earn
their keep" prevailed. -~ the system expanded Trc purchased
huge amounts of farm la~d for agriculture operations and the
inmates were forced to work long hours in the fie:ds. The
idea that the prison sys~em should be self-suppo~ing and
that inmates should earn their keep still prevailed up until
.the Ruiz decision. An a~ded benefit related to control was
the belief that an inmate that works ten hours in the fields
would be too tired at ni;ht to cause trouble. Al~hough most
Texas prisons have incor?orated modern industrial
operations, the prisons are most often still refe=red to as
"farms."
BBen Crouch and Jame:s Marquart, Litigated Refcrm of Texas
Prisons: An Appeal to J~stice, (Austin: Universi~y of Texas
Press, 1989), p. 13.
7
Upon arrival at TDC, an inmate would be assigned a unit
and provided with a copy of the agency's rules and
regulations. Most often, a new inmate would be assigned to
field work. He would quickly learn that everything in TDC
\
had to be earned. The requirement for earning was to Nork
hard, and not violate the rules, or cause trouble. By
competing to be the ideal inmate a prisoner could earn a
better job, assignment to a tetter housing area, good ~ime,
transfers, assignment to schcel, furloughs, and craft shop
privileges. A violation of a~y of the rules would res~lt in
a loss of privileges. Upon teing charged with a viola~ion
of a rule by an officer, the =ase would be heard or tr~ed by
a disciplinary panel composed of a major or captain, a
lieutenant, and a representat~ve from treatment. It WDuld
be a rare occasion that the i=mate would be found not
guilty. The panel would assess t~e penalty which wouli
range from being locked-up (solitary confinement) to l~ss of
prev~ously-earned privileges ~d good time, depending sn the
..seve~ity of the charge. An i=mate could earn time off their
sentence by the award of "goei ti:ne" in addition to the time
actually served. A discipli~ary 8harge could not alte= the
time actually served by an ir~ate; however, the discip~inary
pane~ could take away the gooi t~e which had already ~een
awar~ed to the inmate for goe~ be~avior. Inmates were well
aware that the disciplinary p~el could greatly affect the
actual time spent in TDC by csntr~l of their good time. A
3
major disciplinary case could cost an inmate status which
took years of good behavior to acquire.
By the late 1960's, Texas prisons had developed a
national and even international reputation for order,
\
efficiency, and prisoner safety. Assaults on officers were
extremely rare, and inmate homicide rates were low compared
to those of other large state prisons. For example, in
1973, the homicide rate in Texas prisons were 0.75 per
10,000 ir~ates and staff, while t~e national average was
7.44. The highest homicide rate, in Hawaii, was 49.90.
Escapes and riot in TDC were also rare. Visitors to Texas
prisons, as well as new officers and inmatesy- were always
struck by the dominance of the guards, and the
submissiveness of the inmates. T~ere was seldom any doubt
about who was in charge.9
This stability and order was ~he result of an elabora~e
and largely informal control struc~ure. This control
structure encompassed the formal punishment and rewards
.system, but also included the bui:1ing tender system,
physical force by the guards, and ~n extensive social
structure within the guard ranks.
TDC ~dministration strongly supported and encouraged a
decentra:~zed management philosopt? The warden on each
unit ran iis own unit with little ~nterference from higher
authority. The warden held and used his power to make life
9Ibi1.,p. 46.
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or death decisions. He unquestionably ran his own prison
and this was well understood by both inmates and the guard
force. He made all decisions about which guards were to be
promoted and which were to be fired or given the less
\
desirable jobs. He decided which of his staff supported his
ideas and beliefs and he, in turn, gave preference to these
employees, which led to clique or eli~e status. Most
wardens believed strongly in requiring work from inmates and
worked hard themselves. They demandec and received loyalty
from both guards and inmates. Most fa-Jms or prisons were
located in somewhat isolated areas anc the guards and their
families most often lived on the prisc~ property, which
meant most of a guards' social contac~3 off duty were with
the same group with whom he worked. ~~e result was that
strong esprit de corps existed among tie guard ranks and
they would go to great lengths to sUPF:Jrt each other.
Inmates were viewed and treated in a very paternalistic
manner. Officers considered most pris:Jners to be lazy,
. immature, and certainly inferior. Thi3 was understood by
the inmates ho, in turn, would addres3 officers as "Boss,"
indicating t~e authority the officers ield over the inmates.
Officers wou11 seldom address an inma~ by his true name,
but would be 3.dciressed as "nigger," ,o~exican," or a
nickname give~ to them by the officers. When talking about
inmates, officers would refer to them 3.S"them thieves" or
to individual prisoners as "ole thang.'
10
Officers took great pride in establishing a reputation
of being tough and having "convict sense." Convict sense
indicated that the officer understood the inmates and that
he had great insight and manipulative skill while dealing
\
with inmates. Being tough meant that the officer was not a
push-over and that he was not to be crossed or he would
quickly resort to physical means to solve a problem.
Physical force as punishment and deter=ence was an
important element ~n overall control strategy prior to the
Ruiz decision. Although the use of physica: force was not
sanctioned within any official guidelines, ~he prevailing
attitude was that some inmates only underst~od physical
force. Specifical:y, Texas officers relied on three
increasingly harsh types of physical coerci~n. Inmates who
openly challenged an officer's authority by cursing him or
being belligerent Qr insubordinate would be taken to the
major's office and given a "tune-up." This sanction
involved verbal h~iliation, shoves, kicks, and head slaps
.to scare the inmate into compliance.lo
The second ty?e of physical coercion, :ommonly called
an "ass whipping," usually involved a weapc:l such as a
blackjack, baton, ~r flashlight. These usually occurred
lOIbid.,p. 78.
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during a "tune-up" when an inmate would attempt to fight
back. 11
The third type of force used in TDC was the severe
beating. These occurred infrequently and were reserved for
\
inmates who violated serious rules such as at~acking a staff
member. These "beatings" differed from "ass -,.;hipping"only
in degree. They were intended to inflict serious injury on
the inmate. 12 Force Has considered by officers to be a
legitimate response to blatant inmate transgressions and it
was legitimated by t=adition. Prison is a vis lent world and
physical coercion had always been employed to 8ontrol
inmates in Texas.
Perhaps the strongest form of inmate con~=ol prior to
the Ruiz decision was the use of the "buildinq tender." The
building tenders were inmates who were assigned the duty of
inmate guards. They Here used to control the inmates and
provide information. They carried knives or clubs and
forced compliance by physical force.
Using elite prisoners in this manner was ~enerally
effective in terms 0= cost and control of inm~~es. When the
number of inmates we=e small and stable the p=ison employees
could oversee the ac~ions of the building tent2rs. However,
as the population of the prison system began ~ expand




the system was forced to rely more heavily on the inmate
guards. The building tenders were given wide latitude to
control violence and were heavily depended upon to provide
information to the officers regarding weapons, escape plans,
\
homosexual acts, and drugs. The building tenders often
became so close and trusted by the ranking officers that
they would be used to spy or snitch on other officers. Most
building tenders were selected because of their reputation
as being able to handle o~her inmates. Most were
hard-core, white, older inmates with a history of violence.
With the power they possessed, they controlled mos~ of the
ways to make money in an institution. They sold protection
and ran commissary out of their cell, selling the commissary
for two or three times wr.at they paid for it. They
controlled prostitution ~~d forced the weaker inma~es into a
homosexual role. They wc~ld physically assault or kill an
inmate whom they believe~ posed a threat to them, ~heir
business, or an officer.
The results of the t~ilding tender system wer: low
rates of violence, few s~cides, few homicides, m;~or group
disturbances, no gang vic~ence, and protection for the
afficers, as demonstrate~ by fewer officer assaul~3.
Followinq the Implementation
of the Ruiz v. Estelle Decision
The Amended Decree r:quired that the use of b~ilding
tenders be discontinued ~~d that standards for-the use of
13
force be developed by TDC. The parties subsequently
negotiated additional elements of those standards and agreed
upon a final version of the Standards for the Use of Force
on October la, 1982. In the use of force agreement, TDC
\
agreed to investigate all allegations of illegal use of
force. They also agreed that t~e results of polygraph exams
would be admissible into evider.ce concerning investigat~~ns
of all excessive or unnecessarJ use of force, harassmen~ and
retaliation.D
The use of building tende=s, which TDC previously
denied existence, was disconti~ued. TDC attempted to f~:l
the manpower void by a massive iiring campaign. The ne~
employees were different from tie old guards. They did ~ot
share the same work ethic, they were younger, better
educated and, in most cases, t~ey did not have the same
unders~anding or "convict sense" that the older guards r.ad.
They did not accept, or have tr.egreat desire to be a pa=t
of, t~e old guards' social str~cture. They did not sha=a
_.the s~=ong belief in the correc-:.ness of the way the pris~ns
were ~~n prior to Ruiz and they began to form labor unic~s.
~~e removal of the buildi~~ tenders also broke doWL the
syste~ of gathering informatior.. previously, the syst~
depenCBd heavily on the informa-:.ion gathered by the bui:jing
tende=3 to take action designee to defuse violence.
-~~uiz v. Estelle, TDC Case Briefing and Status a3 of
Januarl 15, 1985, p. 7.
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Additionally, the new guidelines removed the discretion that
officers had to reward inmates for information. The growth
of gangs also hampered intelligence-gathering information
because of the fear of being known as a snitch by the gangs
\
which would most often result in injury or death.1~
The Office of Internal Affairs was established to
investigate and monitor all allegations of excessive or
unnecessarJ use of force and harassment or retaliation.
The inmate disciplinary process was changed so that an
inmate would receive a due process hearing to determine
guilt. A set of guidelines was developed to ensure that the
penalty imposed on the inmate for v~olation of the
Department rules were fair and cons~stent. Additionally,
each inmate would be provided with tie assistance of a
substitute counsel person to assist ~hem in preparing a
defense to be presented at a hearing, prior to any
determination of guilt by the disci~linary committee.
As the guard force began to use the new guidelines they
-began to ur.derstand that necessary f~rce was allowed as long
as the pro~er procedure was followec. They began to use the
inmate disciplinary procedures inste3.d of the "tune-up."
They found that they still had cons~~erable control over the
inmates by ful~y utilizing the inma~= rules and regulations
which incl~ded loss of privileges ar~ good time upon
14Majo= Paul Brown, TDC Gang Intelligence Officer,
interview ty author, 23 February, 1~30, Huntsville.
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conviction. In late 1985 the Director or TDC, Lane
McCotter, ordered that members of disrup~ive groups (gang
members) were to be kept locked in administrative
segregation and that other inmates classified as staff
\
assaultive also be locked down. The results were obvious as
inmate assaults, which were 25 homicides and 404 non-fatal
stabbings in 1984, and 27 homicides and 237 non-fatal
stabbings in 1985, dropped to 3 homicides and 96 non-fatal
stabbings in 1986.:5 This trend has con~~nued to the
present time. The enlarged guard force ias become more
confident and experienced and many have Jbtained positions
of management.
The state has additionally committed itself to a
massive building program. TDC has limit2d admissions to a
level, as direc~ed by the court, to mair.~ain the inmate
population to a level for which the prisJn has adequate
facilities.
TDC has cc~itted itself to accept =esponsibility for
..the administrat~on of its own prison sys~em and encompass
the guidelines set down by the Federal CJurt. It has made
great strides which have been recognizee by the court and
the plaintiff ;~ the Ruiz v. Estelle dec~sion.
The warder. no longer operates each ?rison as a separate
institution. ~e department has developed standardized
15Texas
Office.
De?ar-wnent of Corrections Public Information
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rules and regulations that apply uniformly to all units of
the system. With the creation of Internal Affairs, inmates
and employees can be assured of fair impartial
investigations.
The Compliance division was established to ensure that
all units comply with the provisions set forth in the Ruiz
decision.
As of this date, the court-appointed ~onitors have been
eliminated. Internal Affairs continues to ~nvestigate all
allegations of excessive or unnecessary use of force.
Internal Affairs i~vestigations seldom receive allegations
of physical abuse ~hat was common during t~e-period which
TDC began to implement the Court Ordered Reforms.
The change or procedure brought about jy the Ruiz
decision is broad and far-reaching, partic~arly relating to
control of inmates. The system which had cepended on
physical force, fear, intimidation, use of inmate guards,
and manipulation or t~e rules and regulatic~s is no longer
.~n existence. Guexds are prohibited from ~ing any
excessive or unnecessary force and new emp:Jyee disciplinary
rules mandate punishment within a narrow r~~ge for
violations, which ioes not include corpora: punishment.
Employee rules ant policies prohibit any re-:aliation or
harassment of an ~~ate for use of the grie7ance system.
Inmates are allowed to pursue redress thro~h the legal
system without in-:Brference by the correct~nal staff.
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Inmate guards have been eliminated and replaced by
correctional personnel. Inmates are prohibited from any
form of control or supervision of other inmates. The
Internal Affairs staff investigate allegations of Ruiz
\
related violations and TDC Compliance division ensures that
the Ruiz related issues are being carefully fcllowed. The
grievance procedure allows inmates to appeal disciplinary
cases against them and to seek review of other complaints.
The disciplinarJ procedures which were easily
manipulated prior to the Ruiz decision now have been amended
to ensure that all i~ates are treated fairly. The
procedures are now fcrrnal procedures in which ~he inmate is
charged with a rule violation and the charged ~nmate is
afforded trained personnel to assist in prese~~ing their
case in the best possible light. With proper iocumentation
and use of the disciplinary procedures, viole~~ and unruly
inmates may be placed in administrative segreqation. This
isolates them from t:.egeneral population and Jreatly
_.restricts their oppo~unity to assault other :~ates and
staff. Correctional staff now utilize video cameras to
document incidents i~ which force was used.
It is likely that the debate will contin~~ regarding
the Federal Courts i~terTention in the TDC's affairs. It is
very difficult to de::nd the change if you cor~ider the
numerous loss of livES and millions of dollar~ spent in the
change process. HowEver, it is obvious that ~C has moved
18
to a position of envy of many prison systems. It has in
place operational procedures that allows the correctional
staff to maintain control while safeguarding the
constitutional rights of inmates and staff. TDC is in the
\
process of the largest building program in the history of
the state. It has developed a professional staff and a
safe, secure environment ~or its inmates. With TGC's large
farming, ranching, and industrial operation, it st~ll is
able to keep the cost per inmate at one of the lowest rates
in the nation.
With the current se::-monitoring and administ=ative
commitment to provide a ~rofessional institution, ~t does
not seem likely that TDC sould return to a condit~~n
resembling that of the Tec prior to Ruiz. It alsc seems
likely that, should TDC began to return, the plain:.iff and
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